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What Constitutes Evidence
in an Evidence-Based Psychology of the Whole Person?
Editor’s Introduction

T

he quest for psychology as a natural science began
at least as early as Wundt (1863/1894) and Freud
(1895/1957), and continues today as a press for
evidence-based psychology practice (APATFEBP, 2006).
This is a perfectly laudable goal, since it is reasonable to
expect that science should be as applicable to the study
of the human mind as to anything else in the world. Yet
given that the mind may be not just more complex, but
also differently complex, than other topics of scientific
inquiry undertaken so far, some unique challenges along
the way might be expected. A transpersonal approach may
be able to support the development of an evidence-based
whole-person psychology by pointing out and filling in
central aspects that so far have been largely omitted from
the scientific study of the psyche: the psyche as subject.
Psychology is made unique by the fact that the
human psyche is not only the object of the research, but
also the the researcher of that object. While the reflexive
nature of psychology should not be used as an excuse
to indulge in mystifications, it would seem obvious that
consciousness adds a dimension not encountered in other
scientific disciplines. Nowhere else does the focus of
research talk back to you in your own language; nowhere
else is the object of research so evidently a subject.
Yet scientific method was designed to study
objects, and if a human subject is merely another object,
then it is a very unusual kind of object indeed—one that
makes it hard to see why such a distinction between
subject and object should be made in the first place. On
the other hand, if the psyche represents whatever it is
about people that makes them subjects, and if being a
subject is really any different than being an object, then
it is also reasonable to expect that the scientific study
of subjects might inspire a careful reconsideration, not

only of the methods brought to bear, but also of the
assumptions these might carry.
If one sets to work on a Chevy engine with a
metric tool set, or if the intelligence of an AfricanAmerican child is purportedly measured with scales
based on the things one learns in a middle-class White
community, damage will be done by the fact that the
instruments used carry assumptions that are ill suited to
the task. In the first case, the engine may be damaged; in
the second, the real intelligence of a child may go cruelly
unacknowledged. By this same logic, since scientific
tools were designed to study objects, it seems at least
possible that they might carry assumptions particularly
shaped to the study of objects. The fact that these tools
have proven themselve reliable on many different types
of objects does not in any way remove the possibility
that they might be less than ideally suited to the study
of subjects. Nor would such potential biases be likely
to appear until those tools were applied to humans as
subjects—that is, until the advent of psychology.
There were two options available to the pioneers
of psychology: either tackle the question of how the
study of a subject might have different requirements
and methods, or simply study the mind as if it would be
amenable to tools created for the study of objects. While
early psychologists such as William James and F. W.
Myers attempted some of both approaches, the direction
of the field was sealed with the success of J. B. Watson’s
(1913) behaviorist approach. The subject-ness of the
subject was set aside, and from thence forward the mind
has been studied, for the most part, as if it were an object,
or at best the effect of object-based processes.
One of the strengths of a scientific approach is
the fact that it strives for objectivity, in the sense of being
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relatively impartial, open-minded to where evidence
may lead, and emotionally uninvested in a particular
outcome. However, treating the mind as an object is
something other than objectivity. It might better be
called objectification, a term that in feminist thought
refers to treating a person as if they were an object. To
objectify something can also mean to give something
objective reality, or to express something abstract in a
form that others can experience. All of these meanings
come together in a scientific approach to psychology,
where the psyche—that central yet oddly abstract thing
that makes a human being a person—is treated as if it
were an object in order to turn it into something that can
be studied by an object-oriented science.
The question that arises then is whether the result
is actually a natural science of the mind, or whether it is a
natural science of whatever is left after the subject-ness of
the mind is set aside. If it were the latter, then psychology,
for all of its strengths and value, might be missing out
on some rather important pieces—perhaps even central
aspects of mind. The only practicable way to find out
whether or not it might be possible to construct a scientific
approach to subjectness on its own terms, and whether
or not such an approach might provide information not
available by other means, would be to make the attempt.
Of course, the attempt is already underway in
the form of whole-person approaches to psychology.
Humanistic psychology arose in the 1950s and 1960s out
of the sense that the Freudian and behaviorist approaches
of the day were deeply flawed because they omitted the
central human-ness of the person, treating the individual
more as an object or a machine. Humanistic psychology
enjoyed great success with its more person-centered
approach during the 1960s and 1970s. During this time
it gave birth to transpersonal psychology, which, though
carrying a different emphasis, displays a similar emphasis
on the human being as subject.
Transpersonal psychology has focused considerable attention on consciousness, states of consciousness,
practices or processes that affect states of consciousness,
experiences in which the consciousness of the individual
seems somehow interconnected with that of others or
the larger world, and the transformative potential of
consciousness. Speculations about consciousness have a
long history, and while approaches such as the Gestalt
psychology of Köhler cultivated its early consideration
in Europe, is fair to say that transpersonal psychology
represents the first sustained effort at consciousness
studies within psychology.
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What characterizes a transpersonal approach to
the study of consciousness, and what sets it apart from
much of the current field of consciousness studies, is that
it examines consciousness as human subject-ness, rather
than as an object or as the effect of an object-based
process. This is not to diminish the value of cognitive
and neuropsychological approaches, but to point out
that these also bring with them the object-oriented
assumptions of traditional scientific inquiry.
The issue here is not so much that through
empirical measurement, psychology reduces the human
person to what its instruments can measure. This has
been the complaint of humanistic psychology since its
founding, and is often echoed within transpersonal
psychology as well; certainly, such a point has its merits.
Yet empirical research is not the heart of the problem.
In a very real sense, all explanatory knowledge is to some
degree reductionist in nature (cf. Slingerland, 2008), even
qualitative studies of lived experience. One could argue
that the alternative—the absence of empirical evidence—
leaves knowledge vulnerable to vagaries of preferred
interpretation in ways that may be even more distorting
than the reduction implicit in any responsible form of
inquiry. The more substantive issue is this: in a natural
science of the psyche, what will count as evidence?
So, it is not so much the empirical process
that reduces the human psyche in unacceptable ways,
but the fact that the empirical process typically brings
with it philosophical assumptions about the nature of
mind and matter and reality that preclude asking the
sorts of questions or designing the methods that might
lead to a more useful understanding of subtle and
exceptional experiences that seem closely associated
with the subjectness of the person, such as those that a
transpersonal approach considers.
An alternate path would not require mystical
musings or fantastical assumptions; it would simply
begin with the phenomena as they are reported, then
work from there toward possible methods for detecting
these phenomena in intersubjective contexts—that
is, where the reports of more than one participant
might be consulted to determine whether there is a
phenomenon present that exists as something more than
a private personal construction. If such reports can be
corroborated intersubjectively, then it migh be possible
to seek correlations with conventionally measurable
events, using neurological or other tools—much in the
spirit of Varela’s (1996) neurophenomenology. These
are all foundational steps of a natural science. If one

assumes that mystical, spiritual, and other exceptional
human experiences do not pertain to some transcendent
dimension, but are instead phenomena that occur within
the same dimension as garden rocks and burnt toast (cf.
Ferrer, 2008), then it seems at least potentially possible to
gather evidence—even empirical evidence—that might
shed additional light on the nature of such happenings.
Yet such a step is possible only if these types
of phenomena are not eliminated, a priori, from the
possibility of existing. That is, a transpersonal approach
may be able to contribute to an evidence-based psychology
that would be more reflective of the whole of human
experience and psyche, both as subject and as object of
study, if one sets aside the naïve object-based materialist
assumptions that typically restrain research questions
within more conventional approaches to psychology. From
there, it would be necessary to follow where systematic
inquiry into consciousness and lived experience might
lead. Such inquiry might include examination of reports
of subtle features of consciousness (e.g., Ferrer, 2008,
2011), or might examine aspects of conscious experience
capable of detection and consistent description within
intersubjective contexts (Hartelius, 2007). If such an
approach were to yield novel and useful information,
it would tend to support the notion that object-based
assumptions may constrain psychological research.
In fact, a strong case can be made that humanistic
and transpersonal approaches have already yielded much
fruit, and has had wide impact both within psychology
and within wider culture. Psychotherapy as it exists today
owes much to the rise of humanistic psychology. The
entire personal growth and self-improvement movement
is founded on the tenets of humanistic psychology; these
in turn provided a tremendous boost to the holistic health
and wellness movement that by some measures outstrips
conventional medicine in popularity. Transpersonal
psychology was the first field to examine mindfulness
meditation, and other Eastern spiritual practices such as yoga
and compassion meditation, in the context of psychology.
Abraham Maslow, a founder of both the humanistic and
transpersonal fields, originated the concept of human
spirituality as something distinct from religion—a position
that is now widespread within Western culture. Together,
the transpersonal and humanistic approaches pioneered the
psychological study of psychedelics, which is now coming
to mainstream attention.
Yet if transpersonal and humanistic approaches
have been so innovative, how is it that both are relatively
small and obscure? A look at the fields that have come

in their wake may provide some clues. Consciousness
studies emerged as a separate field in the mid-1990s
with the founding of the Journal of Consciousness Studies,
yet a large amount of its papers consider consciousness
from a cognitive perspective. Positive psychology made
its debut in 2000 with some rather unflattering (and
arguably unfair) critiques of humanistic psychology,
then proceeded to merely examine positive aspects of
the psyche in quite conventional ways. What these two
examples have in common is that their topics became
more widely acceptable only after they became esconced
within fields that examined them as objects or effects
of object-based processes. It would seem that objectoriented philosophical assumptions have been reified
as part of the scientific method, and that they continue
to be applied uncritically to the subject-ness of persons,
with little attention so far to how productive alternate
approaches have been.
In scholarship, the peer-review process is deeply
embedded in teaching, research, and writing precisely
because receiving feedback that requires one to reconsider
ideas and assumptions is what makes for better results.
The deeper a critique can reach, the more effectively it can
identify and challenge underlying theory or assumptions,
the more powerfully it can inspire better scientific
and scholarly work. Transpersonal and humanistic
psychology hold that the consciousness and lived
experience associated with mind—the “what it is like” to
be a person (cf. Nagel, 1974)—pose a healthy challenge to
the object-oriented assumptions of scientific psychology.
If the result of this challenge could be a psychology in
which the scope of what constitutes evidence were not
automatically limited by object-oriented assumptions,
then, as noted, it might be possible to make progress
toward an evidence-based psychology that would, in fact,
be more reflective of the whole of human experience and
psyche. Toward this end, a transpersonal approach might
be of considerable service.
In This Issue
It is noted with appreciation that the three
general articles in this issue all represent original reporting
on the results of research, as are two of the papers in the
Special Topic Section on transpersonal medicine. While
most of these reports represent relatively preliminary
research, this is exactly what one would expect in a field
that may be just beginnning a more empirical phase of
its development.
The first general paper, by Patty Hlava, John
Elfers, and Reid Offringa, is entitled, A Transcendent View

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

v

of Gratitude: The Transpersonal Gratitude Scale; it presents
the development and validation of a gratitude scale
developed from a transpersonal perspective. The items
on this scale were drawn directly from lived experience,
and unlike existing gratitude scales, the definition is not
restricted to gratitude in response to tangible benefits but
considers gratitude within a larger context of relationship
with oneself, others, and the wider world. Such scales are
valuable steps in the development of a more empirically
robust transpersonal psychology.
Jeanine Canty, in her paper entitled, Walking
Between Worlds: Holding Multiple Worldviews as a Key
for Ecological Transformation, presents results from
her organic inquiry research on the characteristics
of individuals moving to embrace a more relational,
life-affirming stance, and a sense of self that is more
interconnected and interdependent with others and the
natural world. Her study suggests that the ability to hold
multiple worldviews may foster greater resilience and
responsiveness to crises of society and environment.
A third study, by David M. Odorisio, is entitled,
The Alchemical Heart: A Jungian Approach to the Heart
Center in the Upanis.ads and in Eastern Christian Prayer,
takes on the task of comparing the concept of the heart,
as an aspect of the person, as it is described in Jungian
thought and in association with the hesychasm prayer
practice of Eastern Christianity. The significance of this
paper is that it attempts comparative work based on the
psychospiritiual processes that each tradition attributes to
the heart—an approach that seems promising for work
toward a broader and more cross-cultural understanding
of what is meant by the heart as a psychospiritual
dimension of the individual.
After this, Randy Fauver has brought together
an excellent set of papers for a Special Topic Section
on transpersonal medicine—or how transpersonal
approaches to physical and emotional healing can be
understood and applied. This section is introduced
separately by the Special Topic Editor. Congratulations
to Randy for bringing together what may be the first
collection of papers under this title.
I am also happy to announce that the California
Institute of Integral Studies, a transpersonally-oriented
university in San Francisco, is now sponsoring this
journal. We are grateful for the support, and the strong
future it provides for IJTS.
Glenn Hartelius, Main Editor
California Institute of Integral Studies
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